"Evidence for the existence of multiple faculties or "intelligences"

When intelligence tests were first assembled, there was little attention paid to the underlying theory of intelligence. But soon the idea gained currency that the different abilities being tapped all fed into or reflected a single "general intelligence." This perspective has remained the view-of-choice among most students of intelligence, though a minority has been open to the idea of different "vectors of mind" or different "products, content, and operations" of intellect (Guilford, 1967; Thurstone, 1938). This minority has based its conclusions on the results of factor analyses of test results; however, it has been shown that one can arrive at either unitary or pluralistic views of intellect, depending upon which assumptions guide specific factor analytic procedures (Gould, 1981).

In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in the idea of a multiplicity of intelligences mental phenomena have been discovered that some researchers construe as evidence for mental modules - fast operating, reflexlike, information-processing devices that seem impervious to the influence of other modules. The discovery of these modules has given rise to the view that there may be separate analytic devices involved in tasks like syntactic parsing, tonal recognition, or facial perception (Fodor, 1983).

A second source of evidence for a multiplicity of intelligences has been the fine grained analysis of the mental operations involved in the solution of items used in intelligence tests (Sternberg, 1977, 1985). These analyses have suggested the existence of different components that contribute to success on any standard intellectual assessment. Individuals may differ from one another in the facility with which the different components operate, and different tasks may call upon a differential use of the various components, metacomponents, and subcomponents. Each of the various "multiple intelligences" perspectives, including my own, concurs on the following proposition: instead of a single dimension called intellect, on which individuals can be rank-ordered, there are vast differences among individuals in their intellectual strengths and weaknesses and also in their styles of attack in cognitive pursuits (Kagan & Kogan, 1970). Our own evidence suggests that these differences may be evident even before the years of formal schooling.

The literature on different individual strengths, as well as the findings on diverse cognitive styles, has crucial educational implications. To begin with, it is important to identify strengths and weaknesses at an early point so that they can become part of educational planning. Striking differences among individuals also call into question whether individuals ought all to be taking the same curriculum and whether, to the extent that there is a uniform curriculum, it needs to be presented in the same fashion to all individuals.

Formal tests can be an ally to the recognition of different cognitive features, but only if the tests are designed to elicit - rather than mask - these differences (Cronbach & Snow, 1977). It is particularly important that instruments used in "gatekeeping" niches (like college admissions) be designed to allow students to show their strengths and to perform optimally. Until now, little effort has been made in this regard and tests are more frequently used to point up weaknesses than to designate strengths.